Mean-field-game model for botnet defense in cyber-security

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Publication:520356

DOI10.1007/S00245-016-9389-6zbMATH Open1372.49049arXiv1511.06642OpenAlexW2962706750WikidataQ59474956 ScholiaQ59474956MaRDI QIDQ520356FDOQ520356

Vassili Kolokoltsov, Alain Bensoussan

Publication date: 3 April 2017

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We initiate the analysis of the response of computer owners to various offers of defence systems against a cyber-hacker (for instance, a botnet attack), as a stochastic game of a large number of interacting agents. We introduce a simple mean-field game that models their behavior. It takes into account both the random process of the propagation of the infection (controlled by the botner herder) and the decision making process of customers. Its stationary version turns out to be exactly solvable (but not at all trivial) under an additional natural assumption that the execution time of the decisions of the customers (say, switch on or out the defence system) is much faster that the infection rates.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.06642




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