How to Detect a Salami Slicer: A Stochastic Controller-and-Stopper Game with Unknown Competition

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Publication:5037503




Abstract: We consider a stochastic game of control and stopping specified in terms of a process Xt=hetaLambdat+Wt, representing the holdings of Player 1, where W is a Brownian motion, heta is a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether Player 2 is active or not, and Lambda is a non-decreasing process representing the accumulated "theft" or "fraud" performed by Player 2 (if active) against Player 1. Player 1 cannot observe heta or Lambda directly, but can merely observe the path of the process X and may choose a stopping rule au to deactivate Player 2 at a cost M. Player 1 thus does not know if she is the victim of fraud and operates in this sense under unknown competition. Player 2 can observe both heta and W and seeks to choose the fraud strategy Lambda that maximizes the expected discounted amount [{mathbb E} left [ hetaint _0^{ au} e^{-rs} dLambda_s ight ],] whereas Player 1 seeks to choose the stopping strategy au so as to minimize the expected discounted cost [{mathbb E} left [ hetaint _0^{ au} e^{-rs} dLambda_s + e^{-r au}M{mathbb I}_{{ au<infty}} ight ].] This non-zero-sum game appears to be novel and is motivated by applications in fraud detection; it combines filtering (detection), non-singular control, stopping, strategic features (games) and asymmetric information. We derive Nash equilibria for this game; for some parameter values we find an equilibrium in pure strategies, and for other parameter values we find an equilibrium by allowing for randomized stopping strategies.



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