Essential stationary equilibria of mean field games with finite state and action space

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.006zbMATH Open1505.91062arXiv2010.09385OpenAlexW3093051385MaRDI QIDQ2108769FDOQ2108769

Berenice Anne Neumann

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Mean field games allow to describe tractable models of dynamic games with a continuum of players, explicit interaction and heterogeneous states. Thus, these models are of great interest for socio-economic applications. A particular class of these models are games with finite state and action space, for which recently in Neumann (2020a) a semi-explicit representation of all stationary equilibria has been obtained. In this paper we investigate whether these stationary equilibria are stable against model perturbations. We prove that the set of all games with only essential equilibria is residual and obtain two characterization results for essential stationary equilibria.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.09385

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zbMATH Keywords

stationary equilibriummean field gameessential equilibriumfinite action spacefinite state space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16) Spaces of games (91A70) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotone solutions for mean field games master equations: finite state space and optimal stopping

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