Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games

DOI10.1016/0005-1098(84)90034-7zbMath0529.90105MaRDI QIDQ787884

Peter B. Luh, Shi Chung Chang, Tsu-Shuan Chang

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(84)90034-7

zbMATH Keywords

credibility; optimality principle; inducible region concept; multistage, deterministic Stackelberg games; robust-Stackelberg strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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