A control-theoretic view on incentives

DOI10.1016/0005-1098(82)90106-6zbMath0477.90003OpenAlexW2129301280MaRDI QIDQ1160549

Peter B. Luh, Geert Jan Olsder, Yu-Chi Ho

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(82)90106-6

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesdecision-makingstochastic modelteam theorymultivariable control systemscyberneticsapplication of control theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)

Related Items (32)

Incentive feedback Stackelberg strategy for stochastic systems with state-dependent noise ⋮ A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem ⋮ Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games ⋮ Pricing problems with a continuum of customers as stochastic Stackelberg games ⋮ A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game ⋮ Inverse Stackelberg solutions for games with many followers ⋮ Incentive schemes using the follower's strategies in differential games ⋮ Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. II: Dynamic problems ⋮ Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems ⋮ Leader-follower strategy via a sliding mode approach ⋮ Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information ⋮ Incentive strategies dealing with uncertainty about the follower's MCDM behaviour ⋮ Incentive feedback Stackelberg strategy for the discrete-time stochastic systems ⋮ Three-level incentive schemes using follower's strategies in differential games ⋮ Incentive Stackelberg Games for Stochastic Systems ⋮ An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination ⋮ Performance bounds for hierarchical systems under partial dynamic information ⋮ Stackelberg solutions of differential games in the class of nonanticipative strategies ⋮ Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets ⋮ Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization ⋮ Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents ⋮ Existence of coordinating prices in dynamic systems ⋮ Adjustment of an affine contract with a fixed-point iteration ⋮ On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems ⋮ Strategic behavior and noncooperative hierarchical control ⋮ Incentive control of humanistic systems ⋮ Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games ⋮ On incentive problems ⋮ Credibility in Stackelberg games ⋮ Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for linear-quadratic descriptor systems ⋮ Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization ⋮ Mini-max incentive strategy for leader–follower games under uncertain dynamics

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