A control-theoretic view on incentives
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1160549
DOI10.1016/0005-1098(82)90106-6zbMath0477.90003MaRDI QIDQ1160549
Peter B. Luh, Geert Jan Olsder, Yu-Chi Ho
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-1098(82)90106-6
incentives; decision-making; stochastic model; team theory; multivariable control systems; cybernetics; application of control theory
91B06: Decision theory
91A80: Applications of game theory
93A13: Hierarchical systems
93E20: Optimal stochastic control
Related Items
Incentive strategies dealing with uncertainty about the follower's MCDM behaviour, On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems, Mini-max incentive strategy for leader–follower games under uncertain dynamics, Incentive Stackelberg Games for Stochastic Systems, Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization, Stackelberg solutions of differential games in the class of nonanticipative strategies, Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games, Credibility in Stackelberg games, Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. II: Dynamic problems, Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems, Adjustment of an affine contract with a fixed-point iteration, On incentive problems, Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games, Pricing problems with a continuum of customers as stochastic Stackelberg games, Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information, An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination, Performance bounds for hierarchical systems under partial dynamic information, Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization, Existence of coordinating prices in dynamic systems, Strategic behavior and noncooperative hierarchical control, Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for linear-quadratic descriptor systems, A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game, Inverse Stackelberg solutions for games with many followers, Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets, Incentive control of humanistic systems, Leader-follower strategy via a sliding mode approach, Incentive feedback Stackelberg strategy for stochastic systems with state-dependent noise, Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents, A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem, Incentive feedback Stackelberg strategy for the discrete-time stochastic systems, Incentive schemes using the follower's strategies in differential games, Three-level incentive schemes using follower's strategies in differential games
Cites Work
- Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory
- Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
- A concept of cooperative equilibrium for dynamic games
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
- Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Team decision theory and information structures in optimal control problems--Part I
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
