Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game

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Publication:1138491

DOI10.1007/BF00935889zbMath0431.90097OpenAlexW2079045656MaRDI QIDQ1138491

Boleslaw Tolwinski

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00935889




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