Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for Stackelberg games with partial information: a geometric approach†
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Publication:3944377
DOI10.1080/00207178208922667zbMath0484.90099MaRDI QIDQ3944377
Publication date: 1982
Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207178208922667
existence; geometric approach; normal form; derivation; leader; follower; asymmetric information pattern; discriminated player; partial dynamic information; linear-quadratic Stackelberg game over Hilbert spaces; optimal affine incentive schemes; sampled state measurements; two-person deterministic Stackelberg game
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
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