Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
DOI10.1007/S10957-014-0694-4zbMATH Open1334.91028OpenAlexW38281563WikidataQ107155286 ScholiaQ107155286MaRDI QIDQ255113FDOQ255113
Authors: Noortje Groot, Hans Hellendoorn, Bart De Schutter 
Publication date: 9 March 2016
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-014-0694-4
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Cited In (7)
- Optimal affine leader functions in reverse Stackelberg games. Existence conditions and characterization
- Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Games with Linear-Quadratic Payoff Functions as Models of Public Goods
- Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game
- Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in games with pay-off functions constructed by minimum convolutions of antagonistic and private criteria
- Existence and computations of best affine strategies for multilevel reverse Stackelberg games
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- Multilevel reverse Stackelberg differential games: existence and solution approach for affine strategies
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