Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability

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Publication:3932614

DOI10.1109/TAC.1981.1102652zbMath0476.90089OpenAlexW2048844388MaRDI QIDQ3932614

Ramal Muralidharan, Peter B. Luh, Yu-Chi Ho

Publication date: 1981

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.1981.1102652




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