Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability

DOI10.1109/TAC.1981.1102652zbMath0476.90089MaRDI QIDQ3932614

Ramal Muralidharan, Peter B. Luh, Yu-Chi Ho

Publication date: 1981

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.1981.1102652

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg games; information structure; organizational design; pricing problems; two-person nonzero-sum game; deterministic closed-loop Stackelberg games; incentive controllability; single stage linear- quadratic-Gaussian Stackelberg problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

90B99: Operations research and management science

91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling

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