Inverse Stackelberg public goods game with multiple hierarchies under global and local information structures
DOI10.1007/S10957-013-0475-5zbMATH Open1309.91036OpenAlexW1969980783MaRDI QIDQ467489FDOQ467489
Authors: Yifen Mu
Publication date: 3 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0475-5
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equilibriumNash equilibriumpublic goods gameinformation structureStackelberg equilibriuminverse Stackelberg gamemultiple hierarchiesstrict TFT
Cites Work
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
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- Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. II: Dynamic problems
- Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems
- Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
- Positive interactions promote public cooperation
- Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers
- Market Structure and Equilibrium
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- Equilibrium strategies in dynamic games with multi-levels of hierarchy
- Towards a theory of game-based non-equilibrium control systems
- Incentive-Based Pricing for Network Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
Cited In (3)
- Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Games with Linear-Quadratic Payoff Functions as Models of Public Goods
- Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game
- Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in games with pay-off functions constructed by minimum convolutions of antagonistic and private criteria
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