On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
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Publication:532516
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0230-1zbMath1213.91067OpenAlexW2162293743MaRDI QIDQ532516
Parimal Kanti Bag, Santanu Roy
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0230-1
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs ⋮ On efforts in teams with stereotypes ⋮ Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting? ⋮ Complementarity and information in collective action ⋮ A note on contribution games with loss functions ⋮ Inverse Stackelberg public goods game with multiple hierarchies under global and local information structures ⋮ Should the talk be cheap in contribution games? ⋮ Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
Cites Work
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Public subscription and private contributions
- Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
- A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
- Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
- Joint Projects without Commitment
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
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