Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2673781
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6zbMath1492.91113OpenAlexW3209117375MaRDI QIDQ2673781
Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto
Publication date: 13 June 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
- Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
- When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
- Sequential voting with abstention
- Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
- Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
- Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits
This page was built for publication: Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?