Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6zbMath1492.91113OpenAlexW3209117375MaRDI QIDQ2673781

Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto

Publication date: 13 June 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
• Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
• Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Decentralized Matching Markets of Various Sizes: Similarly Stable Solutions with High Proportions of Equal Splits

This page was built for publication: Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?