When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.09.001zbMATH Open1426.91091OpenAlexW2973767703WikidataQ127251884 ScholiaQ127251884MaRDI QIDQ2334846FDOQ2334846

Authors: Friedel Bolle 

Publication date: 8 November 2019

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.09.001

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zbMATH Keywords

votingequilibrium selectionthreshold public goodbinary strategytrue majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• Symmetric games revisited
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
• Unique solutions for strategic games. Equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance
• Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game. Theory and experimental evidence
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules

Cited In (3)

• How good is a two-party election game?
• Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters
• Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

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