Robust rational turnout
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Publication:836880
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0396-YzbMATH Open1185.91078OpenAlexW2136372871MaRDI QIDQ836880FDOQ836880
Authors: Tasos Kalandrakis 
Publication date: 9 September 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0396-y
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Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Some Results for Discrete Unimodality
- On participation games with complete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Welfare reducing polls
- The calculus of ethical voting
- A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.
- Public information and electoral bias
- On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
Cited In (11)
- Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
- On participation games with complete information
- On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
- A note on pivotality
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
- Rational voters in a partisanship model
- Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
- A model of electoral behaviour
- Rationalizable voting
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