Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
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Publication:2265346
DOI10.1007/BF01737572zbMath0274.90085OpenAlexW4245882032WikidataQ56047459 ScholiaQ56047459MaRDI QIDQ2265346
Publication date: 1973
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01737572
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