Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart—A Study of Minimal Diversity Games

DOI10.1287/moor.2015.0727zbMath1347.91057OpenAlexW1582597985MaRDI QIDQ2800375

Dries Vermeulen, Dieter Balkenborg

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0727

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitystrategic stabilitystrategic form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games

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