Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart—A Study of Minimal Diversity Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2800375
DOI10.1287/moor.2015.0727zbMath1347.91057OpenAlexW1582597985MaRDI QIDQ2800375
Dries Vermeulen, Dieter Balkenborg
Publication date: 15 April 2016
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0727
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- From evolutionary to strategic stability.
- Potential games
- On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
- Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
- On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability
- Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
- On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Essential equilibria