Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2015.0727zbMATH Open1347.91057OpenAlexW1582597985MaRDI QIDQ2800375FDOQ2800375

Authors: Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen 

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0727

Recommendations

• From evolutionary to strategic stability.
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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitystrategic stabilitystrategic form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The logic of animal conflict
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• Potential games
• Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
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• From evolutionary to strategic stability.
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• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Essential equilibria
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability.
• Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games

Cited In (4)

• Irrelevance of the strategic variable in the case of relative performance maximization
• From evolutionary to strategic stability.
• Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games
• Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games

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