On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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Publication:3363103
DOI10.2307/2938320zbMath0734.90125WikidataQ89186141 ScholiaQ89186141MaRDI QIDQ3363103
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938320
91A10: Noncooperative games
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