On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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Publication:3363103
DOI10.2307/2938320zbMATH Open0734.90125OpenAlexW2086547506WikidataQ89186141 ScholiaQ89186141MaRDI QIDQ3363103FDOQ3363103
Authors: John Hillas 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938320
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- Minimal essential sets and essential components of the equilibria of production economies
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- The study of the system of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems
- On existence and essential components of the solution set for the system of vector quasi-equilibrium problems
- Stability of solutions for variational relation problems with applications
- Strategic stability in Poisson games
- Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium
- Existence and stability of solutions for maximal element theorem on Hadamard manifolds with applications
- On the strongly essential components of Nash equilibria of infinite \(n\)-person games with quasiconcave payoffs
- Bayesian and consistent assessments
- Stability of solutions for Ky Fan's section theorem with some applications
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- The stability of set of solutions for symmetric vector quasi-equilibrium problems
- Berge's maximum theorem to vector-valued functions with some applications
- Essential equilibria of large generalized games
- Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof
- On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games
- A generalization of the Shapley-ichiishi result
- Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
- Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria
- On well-posedness of the multiobjective generalized game
- Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points
- Essential stability of solutions for maximal element theorem with applications
- On the invariance of solutions of finite games
- On existence and essential components for solution set for system of strong vector quasi-equilibrium problems
- Topological essentiality in infinite games
- Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points for multiobjective generalized games in two different topological spaces
- Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games
- Metastable equilibria
- Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
- Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
- Continuous Nash equilibria
- Fall back proper equilibrium
- Essential components of Nash equilibria for games parametrized by payoffs and strategies
- Unified approach to existence and stability of essential components
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- On sustainable equilibria
- The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
- The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability.
- FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- On the finiteness of stable sets
- An ordinal selection of stable sets in the sense of Hillas
- Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
- On quasi-stable sets
- On the existence and essential components of solution sets for systems of generalized quasi-variational relation problems
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
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