Strategic stability in Poisson games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.05.005MaRDI QIDQ406374zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni, Carlos Pimienta

Publication date 8 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2014-09.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingstrategic stabilityPoisson gamesperfect equilibriumstable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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Cited in

(5)

• Poisson search
• The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
• On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability.
• Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players
• On dynamic games with randomly arriving players

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