Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
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Publication:2516123
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0804-0zbMath1341.91058OpenAlexW2101030273MaRDI QIDQ2516123
François Maniquet, Massimo Morelli
Publication date: 11 August 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/13664
Related Items (5)
Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Quaternary dichotomous voting rules ⋮ Quota rules for incomplete judgments ⋮ Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness ⋮ The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
Cites Work
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Large Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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