The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?

DOI10.1007/S10479-022-04927-6MaRDI QIDQ2095940zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michela Chessa, Vito Fragnelli

Publication date 15 November 2022

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04927-6

zbMATH Keywords

blocking powerdecisivenessquorum thresholdstrategic votingvoting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
• The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
• Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
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• Majority rip-off in referendum voting

Cites work

• A decisiveness index for simple games
• A note on ``Measurement of disproportionality in proportional representation systems
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
• Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• Measurement of disproportionality in proportional representation systems
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• Protectionism and blocking power indices
• Quantitative evaluation of veto power
• Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
• Ternary voting games
• Weighted committee games
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

Cited in

(7)

• The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
• Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
• Majority rip-off in referendum voting
• Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right

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