Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
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Publication:449053
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.01.005zbMATH Open1246.91042OpenAlexW2091246836MaRDI QIDQ449053FDOQ449053
Authors: Josep Freixas 
Publication date: 11 September 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/16144
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 15325
Cites Work
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
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- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Ternary voting games
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
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- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Anonymous voting rules with abstention: weighted voting
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- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
- On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
Cited In (21)
- A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
- Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index for simple multichoice voting games
- Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
- Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
- Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
- Reformulation of some indices using null player free winning coalitions
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
- Some open problems in simple games
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- Three-valued simple games
- Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks
- Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems
- On the Distortion Value of Elections with Abstention
- Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index
- A critical analysis on the notion of power
- The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
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