On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention

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Cites work

A class of simple games
A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
Complete simple games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 750169 (Why is no real title available?)
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Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
Stability of decision systems under majority rule
Ternary voting games
The influence relation for ternary voting games
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Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

Cited in

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The influence relation for ternary voting games
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Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories

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