A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9445-0zbMATH Open1378.91015OpenAlexW2250799645MaRDI QIDQ2353604FDOQ2353604

Authors: S. Courtin, Bertrand Tchantcho 

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9445-0

Recommendations

• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
• The ordinal equivalence of the Johnston index and the established notions of power
• Preorders in simple games
• The desirability relation of simple games

zbMATH Keywords

power indicescoalition structuredesirability relationvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• A class of simple games
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Economic power and values of games
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations

Cited In (14)

• Decisions by players of comparable strength
• Preorders in simple games
• Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
• The desirability relation of simple games
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
• The ordinal equivalence of the Johnston index and the established notions of power
• Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks
• Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
• The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games

This page was built for publication: A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2353604)