Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01517-2MaRDI QIDQ6580469zbMATHFDO

Authors Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague

Publication date 29 July 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
• A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Ternary voting games
• The cost of getting local monotonicity
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval

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