Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01517-2zbMATH Open1546.9112MaRDI QIDQ6580469FDOQ6580469

Authors: Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague 

Publication date: 29 July 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ternary voting games
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• The cost of getting local monotonicity
• Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
• A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention

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