Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2567944
DOI10.1007/s003550100145zbMath1072.91527OpenAlexW1979248918MaRDI QIDQ2567944
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100145
Related Items (7)
The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention ⋮ The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities ⋮ Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
This page was built for publication: Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
