Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives
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Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
Recommendations
- A Characterization of an Extension of the Banzhaf Value to Multicandidate Voting Games
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Cited in
(15)- Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
- The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
- A model of influence with a continuum of actions
- Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- A Characterization of an Extension of the Banzhaf Value to Multicandidate Voting Games
- Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
- A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
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