The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
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Publication:333478
DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4zbMath1378.91014OpenAlexW2297701123MaRDI QIDQ333478
Bertrand Tchantcho, Zéphirin Nganmeni, Sébastien Courtin
Publication date: 31 October 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4
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