A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2009.07.011zbMath1180.91061OpenAlexW1991118292MaRDI QIDQ1036550

Luisa Monroy, Francisco Ramón Fernández García

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2009.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

social choicegroup decision makingsimple gamesvoting systemsqualitative multi-criteria games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ Weighted committee games ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union

Cites Work

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• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Vector linear programming in zero-sum multicriteria matrix games
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Core solutions in vector-valued games

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