Extension of values to games with multiple alternatives

DOI10.1023/A:1018901306738zbMath0917.90293MaRDI QIDQ1280585

Francesc Carreras, Antonio Magaña, Rafael Amer

Publication date: 1998

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueBanzhaf-Coleman indexgames with multiple alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (15)

The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ Automorphisms and blocking in simple games ⋮ Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives ⋮ Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ Weighted committee games ⋮ A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players ⋮ Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Multi-Criteria Simple Games ⋮ A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power

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