Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index

DOI10.1007/S10479-016-2124-5zbMATH Open1406.91106OpenAlexW2263481943MaRDI QIDQ512948FDOQ512948

Authors: Josep Freixas, Roberto Lucchetti 

Publication date: 3 March 2017

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162

Recommendations

• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with \(r\) alternatives
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
• Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
• Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power

zbMATH Keywords

powerabstentionaxiomsdecision making processvoting systems in democratic organizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (7)

• Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
• Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
• An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games
• The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
• Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
• The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
• The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?

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