Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5298832 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3932826 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF INDEX OF POWER
- A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
- A method for discriminating efficient candidates with ranked voting data.
- A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
- Collusion properties of values
- Constrained monotonicity and the measurement of power
- Distance-based and ad hoc consensus models in ordinal preference ranking
- Extension of values to games with multiple alternatives
- Generating functions for coalitional power indices: an application to the IMF
- Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Monotonicity of power and power measures
- Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
- Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
- Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
- Power indices for multicandidate voting games
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- Ternary voting games
- The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
- The influence relation for ternary voting games
- The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
- Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(8)- The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- An axiomatization for two power indices for \((3,2)\)-simple games
- Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
- The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
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