A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.

DOI10.1007/s001820050007zbMath1034.91001OpenAlexW2035985377MaRDI QIDQ1972262

Edward M. Bolger

Publication date: 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050007

zbMATH Keywords

consistencymulti-choice gamesvalues\(n\)-person

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (15)

Unnamed Item ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games ⋮ Multi- and multi-polar capacities ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ Bisemivalues for bicooperative games ⋮ The selectope for bicooperative games ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention ⋮ POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES ⋮ A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval ⋮ Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

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