A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives.
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A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
Recommendations
- A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
- A characterization of the multi-choice Shapley value with partially consistent property
- The multichoice consistent value
- A value based on marginal contributions for multi-alternative games with restricted coalitions
- A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players
Cited in
(16)- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
- The selectope for bicooperative games
- Multi- and multi-polar capacities
- A model of influence with a continuum of actions
- Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
- A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- A value based on marginal contributions for multi-alternative games with restricted coalitions
- POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
- A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
- Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
- Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games
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