The selectope for bicooperative games
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Publication:2267654
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2009.11.027zbMath1183.91011OpenAlexW2144086472MaRDI QIDQ2267654
J. J. López, N. Jiménez, Jésus Mario Bilbao
Publication date: 1 March 2010
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.11.027
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