Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
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Publication:4845141
DOI10.1007/BF01432361zbMath0837.90133MaRDI QIDQ4845141
Anne van den Nouweland, S. H. Tijs, Jos A. M. Potters, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publication date: 18 October 1995
Published in: [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q4289815 ZOR Zeitschrift f�r Operations Research Mathematical Methods of Operations Research] (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (52)
The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs ⋮ On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies ⋮ Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games ⋮ Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games ⋮ Multi-choice clan games and their core ⋮ Characterization of additive cost sharing methods ⋮ Solutions and characterizations under multicriteria management systems ⋮ The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure ⋮ Alternative Reductions and Axiomatizations of the Unit-Level-Core ⋮ Two-step coalition values for multichoice games ⋮ Linear production games with committee control: limiting behaviour of the core. ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games ⋮ On importance indices in multicriteria decision making ⋮ Dynamic approaches for multichoice solutions ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem ⋮ A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value ⋮ The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results ⋮ The construction and characterization of egalitarian solutions for multi-choice NTU games ⋮ The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints ⋮ Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games ⋮ A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games. ⋮ The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games ⋮ A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions ⋮ A value for multichoice games ⋮ Prices in mixed cost allocation problems ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games ⋮ The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games ⋮ The multichoice coalition value ⋮ The selectope for bicooperative games ⋮ A dynamic process to the core for multi-choice games ⋮ POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES ⋮ Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing ⋮ The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems ⋮ Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games ⋮ Algorithms for computing the Shapley value of cooperative games on lattices ⋮ Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games ⋮ Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ CAPACITIES AND GAMES ON LATTICES: A SURVEY OF RESULTS ⋮ Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation ⋮ The consistent value of fuzzy games ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games ⋮ MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE ⋮ Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels ⋮ The Shapley value in totally convex multichoice games. ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games ⋮ Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output ⋮ The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
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