Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games

DOI10.1007/BF01432361zbMATH Open0837.90133MaRDI QIDQ4845141FDOQ4845141

Authors: Anne van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs, Jos Potters, José M. Zarzuelo 

Publication date: 18 October 1995

Published in: ZOR Zeitschrift f�r Operations Research Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5504433
• A dynamic process to the core for multi-choice games
• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• Cores of convex games
• The core of multi-choice NTU games

zbMATH Keywords

multi-choice game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Maximal Flow Through a Network
• Cores of convex games
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Monotonic games are spanning network games
• Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• On balanced games and games with committee control

Cited In (58)

• The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results
• Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?
• Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
• Prices in mixed cost allocation problems
• The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games
• The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
• The selectope for bicooperative games
• On importance indices in multicriteria decision making
• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• The consistent value of fuzzy games
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games
• The multichoice coalition value
• The Shapley value in totally convex multichoice games.
• The max-limit-core for multi-choice games
• A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games.
• The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
• The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
• Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games
• Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games
• The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• Multi-choice clan games and their core
• Set-valued TU-games
• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
• A value for multichoice games
• Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies
• Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games
• A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions
• Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games
• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• Cost sharing in production economies
• Linear production games with committee control: limiting behaviour of the core.
• Solutions and characterizations under multicriteria management systems
• POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
• Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games
• Algorithms for computing the Shapley value of cooperative games on lattices
• Two-step coalition values for multichoice games
• A dynamic process to the core for multi-choice games
• The construction and characterization of egalitarian solutions for multi-choice NTU games
• Dynamic approaches for multichoice solutions
• Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games
• Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
• The generalized symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value for multichoice games with a coalition structure
• Power indices under specific multicriteria status
• The core and the dominance core in multichoice multistage games with coalitions in matrix form
• Alternative reductions and axiomatizations of the unit-level-core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Power allocation rules under multicriteria situation
• CAPACITIES AND GAMES ON LATTICES: A SURVEY OF RESULTS
• Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
• MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE

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