Set-valued TU-games

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00398-9MaRDI QIDQ1876169zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Francisco Ramón Fernández García, M. A. Hinojosa, Justo Puerto

Publication date 16 August 2004

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

CoreGame theoryMultiobjective analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Core solutions in vector-valued games
• Domination structures and multicriteria problems in N-person games
• Group decision making under multiple criteria. Methods and applications
• Multicriteria optimization
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• On the core of a class of location games
• On the core of linear production games
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes
• Solution concepts based on security levels in constrained multicriteria convex games
• Two-person non-zero-sum games as multicriteria goal games
• Vector linear programming in zero-sum multicriteria matrix games
• k-convexn-person games and their cores

Cited in

(12)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1858050 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stratification of normative systems with intermediaries
• Intermediaries and intervenients in normative systems
• The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games
• Multiobjective cooperative games with restrictions on coalitions
• A preemptive goal programming for multi‐objective cooperative games: an application to multi‐objective linear production
• Shapley value based allocation for multi-objective cooperative problems
• Semiproportional values for TU games
• Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: a set-valued games approach
• Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games
• Core solutions in vector-valued games
• Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games.

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