Core solutions in vector-valued games
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The authors study vector-valued cooperative games. In other words, the worth of a coalition is given by a vector rather than by a scalar. They extend the classical individual and collective rationality using two different orderings in the payoff space. These two approaches, in fact, share a common solution concept: the set of NonDominated Imputations by Allocations (NDIA). The main properties of NDIA are studied and its relationship with the classical concept of the core is shown.
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Cites work
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Cited in
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