Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0543-4zbMath1280.91017OpenAlexW1982114223MaRDI QIDQ1926595

Francisco Ramón Fernández García, Luisa Monroy

Publication date: 28 December 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0543-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

A novel multiperson game approach for linguistic multicriteria decision making problems

Cites Work

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• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Models in cooperative game theory. Crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games.
• Core solutions in vector-valued games

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