A value for games with n players and r alternatives

DOI10.1007/BF01240129MaRDI QIDQ1313359zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward M. Bolger

Publication date 26 January 1994

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240129

zbMATH Keywords

games with palyers and alternativeslinear, efficient valuevalue theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

This paper studies value theory for a class of games called games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives. In these games, each of the \(n\) players must choose one and only one of the \(r\) alternatives. A linear, efficient value is obtained using three characterizations, two of which are axiomatic. This value yields an a priori evaluation for each player relative to each alternative.

Recommendations

• A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
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• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
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• A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players

Cites work

• A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• N‐person games in partition function form
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• Values of games in partition function form

Cited in

(33)

• A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
• Coalitional values for cooperative games with r alternatives
• Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions
• A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
• The selectope for bicooperative games
• Multi- and multi-polar capacities
• A model of influence with a continuum of actions
• Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
• A generalized Deegan-Packel value for multi-alternative games in case of nonhomogeneous players
• The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
• A value based on marginal contributions for multi-alternative games with restricted coalitions
• POTENTIAL IN MULTI-CHOICE COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
• The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
• A power index in a simple game with multialternatives
• Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
• Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3209730 (Why is no real title available?)
• An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
• Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
• A generalized Deegan-Packel index for multialternative voting games in case of nonhomogeneous voters
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions
• The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games
• Spatial power indices with a finite number of issues
• A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
• Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
• The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
• Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games

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