Power indices for multicandidate voting games
Let N be a finite set of players with cardinality n, and (N,v) a proper simple game. Let R be a finite set of candidates (R\(\subset N)\) with cardinality r. Let P be a partition of N into at most r coalitions, each of which represents the backing for one of the candidates. A candidate is winning if his supporting coalition is winning in the simple game v in partition function form. A player is pivotal if a change in his support for a candidate changes the winning candidate. A player who is never pivotal is a dummy. This paper introduces a power index for the above class of multi- candidate voting games. This power index is based on the count of a player's ordered pivot moves. The main result is that this is the unique power index satisfying the dummy, linearity, and efficiency axioms on the class of voting games.
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
- A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
- Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
- A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
- Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
- Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index
- Voting power when using preference ballots
- Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
- Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
- The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
- On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index
- A model of influence with a continuum of actions
- Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
- The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
- Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
- The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
- The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
- A value based on marginal contributions for multi-alternative games with restricted coalitions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5773528 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
- The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
- A power index in a simple game with multialternatives
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
- Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
- A note on positions and power of players in multicameral voting games
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
- A Characterization of an Extension of the Banzhaf Value to Multicandidate Voting Games
- A generalized Deegan-Packel index for multialternative voting games in case of nonhomogeneous voters
- Political power on a line graph
- Power in plurality voting games
- Freedom and voting power
- A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
- Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
This page was built for publication: Power indices for multicandidate voting games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1087481)
