Values of games in partition function form

DOI10.1007/BF01770871MaRDI QIDQ1245166zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 1977

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770871

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

Shapley's value axioms are adapted to games in partition function form, and the natural extension of the Shapley value for partition function games is derived.

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Cites work

• N‐person games in partition function form

Cited in

(63)

• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
• The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
• Power indices for multicandidate voting games
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
• A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
• Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
• On a class of vertices of the core
• Consistency and the core in games with externalities
• A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
• Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability
• Four-part partition games by transformation of variables in Silverman's game: Details of some examples
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
• Fair division in the presence of externalities
• Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
• Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
• On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index
• Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
• Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
• Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
• The Shapley value for arbitrary families of coalitions
• How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem
• The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
• A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
• Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
• The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
• Marginal Contributions in Games with Externalities
• A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form
• Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
• A decomposition for the space of games with externalities
• An extension of the solidarity value for environments with externalities
• THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES
• Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
• N‐person games in partition function form
• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
• Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
• Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources
• Externalities, potential, value and consistency
• Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
• Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
• Power in plurality voting games
• Cooperative games with externalities, marginalism and the average approach
• A null-player axiom for the Myerson value in partition function form games: a note
• Two families of values for global cooperative games
• Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
• Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
• Coalition value evaluation in cross-partition function games: a bilateral bargaining approach
• Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
• Efficient bidding with externalities
• Fair allocation in networks with externalities
• Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
• The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives
• The lattice of embedded subsets
• Flexible network rules for identified externalities
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities

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