Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.06.002zbMATH Open1133.91305OpenAlexW3023665518MaRDI QIDQ2482641FDOQ2482641

Authors: Yuan Ju, Peter Borm 

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/3698/1/juy1.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

compensationexternalityconcession rulemarginalistic ruleprimeval gamesprimeval rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• N‐person games in partition function form
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Values of games in partition function form
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

Cited In (4)

• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching
• Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?

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