Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
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Publication:996381
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001zbMath1186.91111MaRDI QIDQ996381
David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein, Inés Macho-Stadler
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001
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- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
