Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
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Publication:1006585
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0335-yzbMath1156.91315OpenAlexW2139726011MaRDI QIDQ1006585
Publication date: 25 March 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/implementing-cooperative-solution-concepts(a0415c9e-d51e-4c93-8872-8229704ea104).html
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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