Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.08.009MaRDI QIDQ690981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuan Ju

Publication date 29 November 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/75036/1/1_s2.0_S030440681200064X_main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingShapley valuesubgame perfect equilibriumrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Intra firm bargaining and Shapley values
• Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value
• On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Efficiency and Immediate Agreement: A Reply to Hart and Levy
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• On weighted Shapley values
• Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(4)

• One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
• Intra firm bargaining and Shapley values
• Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
• A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

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