Efficiency and Immediate Agreement: A Reply to Hart and Levy

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00059MaRDI QIDQ4530951zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Faruk Gul

Publication date 28 May 2002

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00059

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(4)

• Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
• A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach

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