Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining

DOI10.1007/s001990050177zbMath0891.90183OpenAlexW2092089338MaRDI QIDQ1381082

D. Massart

Publication date: 15 March 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050177

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic process\(k\)-player sequential bargainingunique stationary subgame perfect payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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