On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0306-8zbMath1151.91046OpenAlexW2004322815MaRDI QIDQ957861

Harold Houba, Quan Wen

Publication date: 1 December 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/de9325b0-e3fd-4a51-a73c-fffadcbb28c6

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingnegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences ⋮ Backward induction and unacceptable offers ⋮ Sustainable development mechanism of avoiding group conflict and symbiosis: a study on labor disputes ⋮ A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

Cites Work

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• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations

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