Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4845248
Recommendations
Cited in
(52)- Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
- Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
- Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure
- An extension of Rubinstein's negotiation game
- Delay in bargaining games with complete information
- Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
- Bargaining with habit formation
- Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium
- Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment
- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
- Delayed probabilistic risk attitude: a parametric approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4083409 (Why is no real title available?)
- Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations
- Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- BARGAINING MODEL WITH SEQUENCES OF DISCOUNT RATES AND BARGAINING COSTS
- Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
- On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
- Strategic bargaining with destructive power.
- Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
- The policy bargaining model
- Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
- Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
- Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
- Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models
- Backward induction and unacceptable offers
- Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations
- Holdup, search, and inefficiency
- Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
- A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives
- Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Delay in a bargaining game with contracts
- Costless delay in negotiations
- Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
- The power to delay
- Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
- Simultaneous moves multi-person continuous time concession game
- Incomplete property rights and overinvestment
- Justifiable punishments in repeated games
- A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers
- Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
- Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions
- Game theory and strategic complexity
- Strategic step-by-step negotiation
- Holdup and innovation
- COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
This page was built for publication: Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4845248)
