Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

DOI10.2307/2171907zbMath0837.90128MaRDI QIDQ4845248

Lutz-Alexander Busch, Quan Wen

Publication date: 22 October 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsresrpt/506

zbMATH Keywords

delay; repeated games; negotiation; alternating-offers bargaining; disagreement game; multiple perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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