Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

DOI10.1007/S001990050208MaRDI QIDQ1389244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Clara Ponsatí, József Sákovics

Publication date 1998

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050208

zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect equilibriumRubinstein bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(19)

• An extension of Rubinstein's negotiation game
• Bargaining with habit formation
• An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment
• Arbitration systems and negotiations
• Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration
• Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: decomposable rules
• Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
• Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game
• The bargaining trap
• Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
• Outsiders' threat and consecutive offers
• On the outside-option principle with one-sided options
• The power to delay
• Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
• Incomplete property rights and overinvestment
• Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration

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