Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0481-6zbMath1235.91134OpenAlexW3125169652MaRDI QIDQ647544

J. Atsu. Amegashie

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2009/2009-02.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (1)

Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model

Cites Work

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• Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Effective property rights, conflict and growth
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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