Incomplete property rights and overinvestment
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Publication:647544
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0481-6zbMATH Open1235.91134OpenAlexW3125169652MaRDI QIDQ647544FDOQ647544
Authors: J. Atsu. Amegashie 
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2009/2009-02.pdf
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Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Effective property rights, conflict and growth
- Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
- Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
Cited In (6)
- Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms
- Cooperation and distributive conflict
- Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities
- Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model
- Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes
- Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
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