Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0481-6MaRDI QIDQ647544zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Atsu. Amegashie

Publication date 23 November 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2009/2009-02.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Effective property rights, conflict and growth
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(6)

• Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities
• Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms
• Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model
• Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach
• Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes
• Cooperation and distributive conflict

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