Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2828zbMath1018.91003MaRDI QIDQ1851226

Nejat Anbarci, Stergios Skaperdas, Constantinos Syropoulos

Publication date: 16 December 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c3fcd8992ba97cdb6860551c9f94717f028482f9

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining; division rules; variable threat payoffs; variable utility possibilities set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Predation and accumulation., Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem, Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects, Rent protection as a barrier to innovation and growth, The theory of contests: a survey

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