Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.001MaRDI QIDQ665071zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luciano Andreozzi

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionfairnessheterogeneous agentsspecific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Social dynamics
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach

Cited in

(3)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 975528 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incomplete property rights and overinvestment
• Evolution, investment, and bargaining

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