Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.001zbMATH Open1278.91033OpenAlexW2153756061MaRDI QIDQ665071FDOQ665071

Authors: Luciano Andreozzi 

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.001

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zbMATH Keywords

fairnessevolutionheterogeneous agentsspecific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Social dynamics
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.

Cited In (3)

• Evolution, investment, and bargaining
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

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